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It is an apparent truism about visual perception that we
can see only what is visible to us. It is also frequently
accepted that visual perception is dynamic: our visual
experiences are extended through, and can evolve over
time. I argue that taking the dynamism of visual experi-
ence seriously renders certain simplistic interpretations
of the first claim, that a subject at a given time can see
only what is visible to her at that time, false: we can be
meaningfully said to see invisible objects. This counter-
intuitive result in turn focuses our attention on the rela-
tionship between perception and memory. I show that it
is difficult to draw a clear or simple distinction between
the two.Memory and perception rely on, and blendwith,
one another. Together, these claims point us away from
understanding visual perception as a simple reflection
of the environment, and instead as closer to a process of
dynamic modelling that draws together occurrent stim-
ulation and stored information.
It is an apparent truism about visual perception that we can see only what is visible to us. It is
also frequently accepted that visual perception is dynamic: our visual experiences are extended
through time, allowing them to change and evolve through it. I argue that taking the dynamism
of visual experience seriously renders certain simplistic interpretations of the first claim, that a
subject at a given time can see only what is visible to her at that time, false. In particular, subjects
can see objects during brief periods of occlusion. The primary relation a subject at a givenmoment
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in time bears is to an extended period of visual experience, long enough to include moments at
which certain objects may be briefly invisible. Once we prioritize this temporally extended experi-
ence over the constituentmoments throughwhich it extends, the subject can still bemeaningfully
said to see those objects despite their momentary invisibility in virtue of their visibility during the
relevant extended period of experience. That is the first argumentative goal of this paper.
This is in some respects a highly counter-intuitive result. One way we might defend against
it is to claim that the kind of extended, dynamic representations which support that claim are
not genuinely perceptual. Instead, they are representations in memory. But when we try to clarify
the requisite distinction between memory and perception, we find that it is hard to draw a clear
line between the two. Instead, representations frommemory are intimately woven into perceptual
representations, and similar or identical neural processes support the two. Memory and percep-
tion are not opposed categories: perception, even of the present, relies on memory in a range of
ways. This is the second argumentative goal of this paper. Between them, these two claims point
us away from understanding visual perception as a simple reflection of the world around us, and
instead as closer to a process of dynamically modelling the environment, by integrating occurrent
stimulation and remembered information.
The paper proceeds as follows. In section one I set out in more detail the claim that visual
experience is dynamic. In section two, I argue that allowing that the primary unit of visual object
perception is temporally extended pushes us towards allowing that we can be meaningfully said
to see invisible objects. In section three I consider the objection that such representations are not
genuinely visual, and argue that it relies on an unsustainably rigid distinction between perception
and memory.
1 DYNAMIC PRIORITY
Philosophers commonly talk of having “a” visual experience - of a tomato, or a table, or a car
crash - as though visual experience came in units. This invites the question: what is the temporal
duration of such a unit? Does visual experience present the subject with a series of static snapshots
with no temporal extension of their own, or does the most basic unit of visual experience develop
and extend over time?
What would it mean to claim that visual experience is temporally extended?1 It is clear enough
that I am having a visual experience now, and was having one five minutes ago, and that there
is some kind of continuity between those. Equally, one can, if one so desires, identify and talk
of momentary snapshots within that period of experience. For claims about the temporal exten-
sion of visual experience to be non-trivial, they must be claims about metaphysical priority: are
momentary snapshots the basic unit of visual experience, from which extended periods of experi-
ence are constructed, or is the most basic visual relation to an extended period of experience that
presents something of temporal breadth, within which we can then pick out particular moments?
I will call the view that visual experience is fundamentally temporally extended, Dynamic
Priority.
Dynamic Priority: the minimal “unit” of visual experience to which a subject is related is tem-
porally extended
If Dynamic Priority holds, an extended period of experience is not determined by its successive
instantaneous temporal parts.2 From a representationalist perspective, one way of understand-
ing Dynamic Priority is as the claim that the content and character of a subject’s experience at
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a moment in time is indeterminate: they depend on facts about a longer period of time within
which the experience is embedded.
The important contrast here is with a view on which the subject is primarily related to instan-
taneous snapshots of experience, which could together comprise an experience that presented
something of temporal breadth, in such a way that that extended experience would be secondary
to, or metaphysically dependent on, those instantaneous snapshots.3 Dynamic Priority is, as its
name would suggest, a claim about the priority of a certain temporal scale of visual experience. It
does not deny that we can individuate instantaneous snapshots of experience for our own theo-
retical purposes, only that such an isolation is secondary to, or parasitic on, temporally extended
experience. This is the same kind of metaphysical priority that Ian Phillips describes in his (2011):
What does it mean to say that a duration of experience is metaphysically prior to its
sub-parts? It is not to deny that there are facts about instants during our stream of
consciousness. It is, however, to insist that such facts are derivative. The most basic
facts about our experiential lives are, in the first instance, facts about extended periods
of the stream of consciousness. What is true at an instant is true only in virtue of that
instant being an instant during a certain period of experience. (Phillips, 2011, 398)
A dynamic priority claim is a natural fit with the kind of extensionalism about temporal expe-
rience which Phillips endorses (Phillips, 2010), a view on which, as Barry Dainton puts it, “our
episodes of experiencing are themselves temporally extended”, in away that allows our experience
of temporal properties to rely on the temporal extension of the experience itself (Dainton, 2018).4
By contrast, the retentionalist claims that our experience of temporal properties such as change
can be generated at a moment, that it does not require that our experience itself be extended
through time. On this view, experiences which themselves have no or minimal temporal duration
in objective time can nonetheless provide a window onto an extended period of subjective time
(G. Grush, 2005; Lee, 2014). Depending on the details of their position, some form of dynamic
priority may also be endorsed by the retentionalist, either because they allow that the relevant
atoms are themselves temporally extended in some significant way, or because they agree that at
least certain experiences or experiential contents emerge from the pretension or retension of a
series of such atoms, in a way that cannot be reduced to their individual contents. Dynamic prior-
ity is inconsistent only with the kind of "atomism" described by Philippe Chuard (2011), on which
perceptual experience is a series of static snapshots with no presentation of temporal features.5
That literature on temporal experience is chiefly concerned with our experience of temporal
properties themselves, such as change, or movement. By contrast, I am interested in a dynamic
priority claim about visual perception of objects in particular – cases when a subject sees some-
thing as a spatio-temporally continuous particular. Why focus on object perception? Increasingly,
work in vision science takes perceptual objects, rather than space per se, to be the fundamental
currency of visual perception (Scholl, 2001; Vickery & Chun, 2010). This meshes with a philo-
sophical emphasis on the attributive nature of visual perception (Burge, 2010) and its particular-
ity (Schellenberg, 2016): both presuppose the centrality of objects to visual perception. If object
perception is temporally extended, in the sense that dynamic units have priority over momentary
time slices, then much of visual perception is inherently dynamic.
Applying Dynamic Priority to object perception, we arrive at the following claim:
Dynamic Priority (objects): the minimal “unit” of visual experience to which a subject is
related when seeing an object is temporally extended.
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What does this really mean? Imagine a subject, Bernadette, who is looking at a banana.
Bernardette’s experience of the banana extends from t1 through to t5. We can zone in on her expe-
rience at t4. One way of understandingDynamic Priority is as the claim that it wouldn’t be possible
for Bernadette to have whatever experience she is having of the banana at t4 without the experi-
ence that occurs between t1 and t5 of which t4 is a part. The moment is parasitic on the whole.
If visual experience is genuinely dynamic, we should think of an individual at a moment in time
as primarily related not to a momentary slice of visual experience that corresponds to the instant
under investigation, but to an extended period of subjective experience which includes their expe-
rience at that moment.6 A representationalist could say that there is no fact of thematter what the
content or character of Bernadette’s experience of the banana is at t4, except facts that are derived
from her temporally extended experience. Her experience at t4 does not supervene just on facts
about her experience at that time, but on facts about some longer period of time.
Here is another way of understanding the claim of interest. Supposewe could successfully spec-
ify what Bernadette is seeing at t4 without referencing or knowing anything about her experience
at t1-t3 or at t5. In such a case, is Bernadette plausibly seeing an object at t4? Dynamic object
perception claims that the answer to this question is ‘no’: we can only attribute genuine object
perception to a subject whose visual experience has some minimal temporal extension, and if we
can fully specify Bernadette’s visual experience at a moment, then whatever its content it cannot
include the visual perception of an object.
Dynamic object perception leaves openwhat Bernadette does see in this case: it is plausible that
certain properties could be momentarily perceptible even if objects were not (colour, contrast, or
illumination, for instance that need not be bound to a visual object). But dynamic object percep-
tion could also be coupled with, or taken to naturally support, additional dynamic priority claims,
for instance that certain properties which may be integral to object representation (such as size
or shape) also require temporally extended visual experience.
Auditory experience is often thought to be temporally extended in this way (Nudds, 2010;
O’Callaghan, 2009). Consider listening to a cadence at the end of a phrase of music. A phrase
of music ending in a perfect cadence and one ending in an interrupted cadence may conclude on
the very same chord. It can seem as though one’s experience of hearing that final chord differs
in the two cases not just in the sense of completion or homecoming that the perfect cadence has,
and which the interrupted cadence promises and then turns away from, but in the more basic
auditory experience of hearing the notes themselves.7 One hears a middle C as the concluding
note of a perfect cadence, for instance, rather than the concluding note of an interrupted cadence.
Dynamic priority can naturally accommodate this holistic element to our auditory experience:
some longer period of auditory experience has priority over the moment, whose development
and internal structure and relations partly determine the experience picked out at any instant
within that period of time. According to this interpretation of the cadence case, facts about the
subject’s auditory experience at t5 depend on facts about their experience through moments t1-t5.
If Dynamic Priority about object perception is right, then visual experience of objects is thorough-
goingly like our auditory experience of cadences in this respect: the subject’s visual experience is
more than the sum of its parts.
2 FROMDYNAMIC PRIORITY TO SEEING INVISIBLE OBJECTS
Awide range ofmotivations couldmove one to endorseDynamic Priority about object perception.
For some, it will seem to be a necessary truth about visual object perception, one which falls out of
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conceptual considerations of what it is to see an object.8 For others, it may seem to have the status
of a truth they can read off from their own visual phenomenology. For still others, phenomena
such as visual constancy or our perception of motionmight seem to require that something in the
vicinity is true.9 And finally, the strongest support for the claimmay arise from some combination
of these various considerations.
My concern here is not to weigh the evidence in its favor, but to consider what follows from it.
According to Dynamic Priority (objects), the primary unit of visual experience involved in object
perception is temporally extended. The content and character of the experience at a moment in
time taken on its own is indeterminate: it is onlywhen it forms part of a longer period of experience
that it comes to be a moment of object perception. What ramifications does this have for what we
can be said to see? I will argue that a dynamic priority claim for object perception disrupts our
ordinary understanding of what we see because it loosens the reins between the input the visual
system receives at a moment and the subject’s conscious visual experience at (or very slightly
after) that time. This loosening opens the way to allowing that we can see objects even during
brief periods of invisibility.
Consequently, endorsing Dynamic Priority for object perception involves denying
Occurrent Visibility: A subject S sees an object o at time t only if o is visible to S at t*.
where t is offset from t* by just so long as it takes for the visual system to perform the relevant
visual processing, that is, probably within a few hundred milliseconds at the most, ((VanRullen
& Thorpe, 2001)).
Put another way, endorsing Dynamic Priority in the context of object perception entails the
following claim:
Seeing the Invisible: a subject may see objects at time t which are not visible to her at t*.
What is built into the notion of visibility and invisibility in play in this claim? Since we’re inter-
rogating the relationship between seeing and invisibility, we must work with a definition of the
latter that is independent of the former. An object is invisible, for my purposes, when it is inca-
pable of reflecting light in a manner that could be detected by a light sensitive surface such as
the retina, or when, though the relevant light patterns are detectable by retinal photoreceptors,
that information cannot be transmitted to the cortical visual system. Objects are most straightfor-
wardly invisible in this sense when they are occluded, or alternatively when some block on the
visual system prevents their uptake: you are invisible to me if I have my eyes shut.10 Our ordi-
nary notion of invisibility is indexed fairly precisely to a time: invisible ink is invisible on the page
though it was visible when we wrote with it. Harry Potter is invisible when under his invisibility
cloak, but visible without it. This time-indexing gives rise to the tension I am interested in, with
a dynamic view of object perception.
Our focus for the moment then is on the question of whether a subject can be said to see an
object, though it is temporarily incapable of reflecting light in a way that could be detected by the
subject. Our ordinary conception of sight is tightly tied to that ability. I shall argue that Dynamic
Priority puts pressure on that, encouraging us to reconceive of visual perception as a process of
modelling both visible and invisible elements of a spatially and temporally extended scene.
To proceed with this argument, we first need a criterion of seeing. Our concern at the moment
is not to arrive at a full specification of such a criterion, but to explore whether the invisibility of
an object at a brief moment in time automatically disqualifies the subject from being said to see
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the object. Unfortunately, there is little agreement about what it takes to see an object, but there
is at least some consensus that seeing involves a phenomenal experience of a particular kind,
which must bear an appropriate causal relation to the object in question, so that, for instance,
the subject’s conscious experience represents the appearance of the object with some reasonable
degree of sensitivity.
Seeing an object: A subject S sees an object O when they (i) have a conscious visual experi-
ence of O that is (ii) reasonably sensitive to O’s appearance in virtue of (iii) an
appropriate causal relation to O.
This is intended to be schematic. The key question we are pursuing is whether momentary
invisibility is inconsistent with a reasonable precisification of these three key elements once a
dynamic priority claim is assumed. I will argue that it is not, and that we should consequently
allow that the subject sees the object throughout the brief period of invisibility.
2.1 Saccades
To see how Dynamic Priority supports these claims, consider what happens during moments
when the flow of retinal information is interrupted, for instance when you saccade, or blink.
A saccade occurs when you refocus your attention within a visual field by skipping both eyes
across it simultaneously. Doing this repeatedly lets you build up a more accurate representation
of the environment by moving the fovea, the most light-sensitive part of the retina, to acquire
high quality information about a range of points within the visual field (Hollingworth, Richard,
& Luck, 2008). Though these jumps typically happen at least a couple of times a second, we do
not generally notice them occurring. To achieve this apparently seamless continuity, your sensory
input partially cuts out whilst the movement occurs (Vallines & Greenlee, 2006). Otherwise, you
would have a blurred interlude in the experience, as though viewing the world from a fast-moving
vehicle.
Deliberate manipulation in experimental conditions reveals a period of desensitization that
begins somewhere between 75 and 50 ms prior to the saccade, peaking at its start, and per-
sisting through it. (Krekelberg, 2010; Ross, Morrone, Goldberg, & Burr, 2001). During this
time, “stimulus-driven responses in early areas of the visual pathway are selectively inhibited”
(Greenlee & Kimmig, 2019, 175). The diminution of sensitivity is sufficiently dramatic during this
period of “saccadic suppression” that experimental subjects may fail to detect spatial shifts within
a certain scale in an object’s location if the object moves whilst the eyes are inmotion (Li &Matin,
1990).11 Even outside of experimental conditions, the impossibility of catching oneself saccading
in a mirror is a tell of this temporary reduction in stimulus sensitivity (Krekelberg, 2010).
During the period of saccadic suppression, the object cannot be detected by the visual system
and is in this sense invisible. Nonetheless the subject sees the object during this time period. Mea-
suring the subject’s experience during this time against our criterion of seeing we find that the
subject has a conscious visual experience of the object that is reasonably sensitive to the object’s
appearance: it accurately represents its key featural properties in spite of the limited diminution
in sensitivity to location.12 The subject has that visual experience in virtue of a causal relation-
ship with the relevant object. There is a brief temporal displacement between the cause and the
conscious experience of it, but outside of carefully constructed experimental conditions this is not
sufficient to disrupt the sensitivity to the appearance of the stimulus described above. At this level
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at least, momentary invisibility seems perfectly compatible with seeing. The case of saccades is
significant because it reveals that the functioning of the visual system is designed around the fact
that objects are not continuously visible to it: it is constantly compensating for diminutions in the
flow of information from the retina.
Itmight be objected that the object is not straightforwardly invisiblewhen the subject saccades –
others present could still see it after all. But we can easily construct a parallel hypothetical case in
which saccadic suppression is instead paralleled by intermittent invisibility, for instance, imagine
an object that passes behind a series of occluders at just the right rate – say for roughly 50 ms at a
time, depending on lighting conditions – such that the visual system is unable to detect its periodic
absences, producing instead a perceptual experience as of a continuously present object.13 (This
seemsmechanically feasible: we know, for instance, from various apparent motion effects that we
can have an experience as of an object in continuous motion, when briefly shown stimuli sepa-
rated by intervals of between 25 and 400 ms (Colman, 2009)). In this intermittent occlusion case
the subject would have a conscious experience of the object which is sensitive to its appearance,
in virtue of a causal relationship with the object in question. The sensitivity is not so fine-grained
in these cases that the subject detects the moments of invisibility, and this is where the Dynamic
Priority thesis plays a role. The Dynamic Priority thesis for objects claims that object perception
is temporally extended, such that the content and character of the subject’s experience at those
brief moments of invisibility is determined by the content and character over a longer period of
time. Over those several seconds the subject’s experience is sensitive to the object’s appearance,
and it is entirely natural to say that the subject sees the object. In light of that, when we assign a
content to the moment of saccadic suppression or hypothetical disappearance, the subject can be
said to see the object in spite of that momentary invisibility or suppression of neural activity.
The take home from both these kinds of cases is that in line with Dynamic Priority (objects)
there is temporal flexibility in the causal relationship demanded by our ordinary notion of see-
ing, such that the subject sees the object despite its momentary invisiblity. But how far does that
extend? In the cases above, the subject is not conscious of the object’s invisibility. Could a subject
see an object that is momentarily invisible in cases when that invisibility is a feature of their con-
scious experience? I turn next to considering certain cases of occlusion which, I shall claim, meet
this specification.
2.2 Occlusion
Momentary occlusion occurs when one object passes briefly behind another. When observing
occlusion of this kind, you seem to see the object disappear and emerge from behind the occluder
as part of a single coherent experience of its uninterrupted trajectory. You do not simply expe-
rience an object approach the occluder and incrementally disappear, and then a distinct object
incrementally appear on the other side of it, though the latter event would involve an identical
pattern of visual stimulation. This phenomenon of seeing the object as having a continuous trajec-
tory whilst passing behind the occluder and out the other side is called the tunnel effect (Burke,
1952). Figure 1, provides an illustration of this kind of case, where the episode takes place over a
few seconds.
Compare this with a case in which the object implodes just as it approaches the occluder and
then explodes on the other side, that is, it shrinks to nothing and then suddenly grows from noth-
ing on the other side. In this case, you have the experience of seeing the object approach the
occluder, disappear and then reappear. Cases like this are designed to be as statistically similar
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F IGURE 1 An object passing
behind an occluder and emerging on the
other side of it [Color figure can be
viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
F IGURE 2 An object approaching
an occluder, imploding, and then
another object exploding on the other
side [Color figure can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com]
to the occlusion case as possible, whilst not giving rise to the tunnel effect. Figure 2 provides a
schematic illustration of such a case.14
What do you see at t5 in the two cases above? The same stimulus is available to the eye in both
cases at that moment: a round, black, object on the right-hand side of the rectangular occluder.
But what observers are prone to report seeing is different in the two cases. In the occlusion
case, one sees the object as having emerged from behind an occluder, whereas in the implo-
sion case one sees the object as having just appeared beside the occluder. As when listening to
a cadence or an utterance, what the subject experiences at t5, when the object is on the other side
of the occluder, is palpably different in virtue of that moment in time being a part of an extended
period of visual experience, that includes the preceding moments during which the object moved
behind the occluder. The content and phenomenology of visual experience at a moment seems to
depend on the longer period of time of which that moment forms a part.
We can shore up this self-report of the phenomenology of seeing an object pass behind and
emerge from an occluder with some more objective investigation of our visual representations
during occlusion. Scholl and Pylyshyn, (1999) have investigated these kinds of contrast cases using
an object tracking paradigm. Subjects had the task of tracking a number of target objects, which
either passed behind an occluder, or which appeared to implode on one side of it, and explode on
the other. They found that subjects are better at tracking objects that disappear and reappear than
those that implode and explode. Similarly, it is harder to track featural changes (such as color) of
objects that implode or explode than of objects that are occluded. Change detection is better when
it occurs within the same persisting object representation (Flombaum & Scholl, 2006).
Considering the representational vehicles posited to underlie visual object perception helps
us understand these effects. Object perception relies on so-called “object files”, a kind of mental
folder that is opened when something is identified as an object, as a store for information about it.
(Green & Quilty-Dunn, 2017). Objects files are temporally extended: they persist through feature-
change, allowing you to see an object that changes color as it moves, for instance, as just that,
rather than as a series of distinct objects, of different colors, at different locations.15 Object files let
us identify objects as the same object despite changes in spatiotemporal and featural properties,
such as shape, colour and category (Kahneman, Treisman, & Gibbs, 1992; Scholl & Flombaum,
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2010). The fact that that information is assimilated to one and the same persisting object file is
what gives rise to a representation of change, or movement, consistent with the survival of the
same object.
Appeal to object files helps us understand the differences between our experience of briefly
occludedmoving objects, as compared with an imploding/exploding pair of objects. One explana-
tion for our superior abilities at identifying feature change in the former is that object representa-
tions are maintained during occlusion, but not during statistically equivalent events inconsistent
with the on-going survival of the object in question. The apparent implosion of an object closes the
relevant object file. Another file is opened when the object explodes into existence. The change
in object files makes it much harder to track feature change in the relevant items. (Flombaum
& Scholl, 2006; Scholl & Pylyshyn, 1999). This is consistent too with evidence of neural activity
within the visual cortex which continues despite the occlusion of the object in question, suggest-
ing the active maintenance of the relevant object representation (Hulme & Zeki, 2007).16
To recap: when an object passes behind an occluder and emerges again, both the phenomenol-
ogy of seeing that object, and the kinds of tasks we’re able to perform in relation to it, are different
from a statistically closely equivalent case in which an object approaches an occluder, disappears,
and then an object reappears on the other side of the occluder, in a manner inconsistent with its
survival. The object file survives occlusion but not implosion, and that difference has an impact on
the content and character of the subject’s experience at the point of invisibility. During occlusion
the object is experienced as occluded whilst in the case of implosion it is not, and that difference
at t3 makes a difference to the subject’s visual experience of the object at t5, when it reappears, in
a manner consistent with Dynamic Priority. The persistence of the underlying object file provides
a mechanism for the integration of information over an extended time period, of the kind that
Dynamic Priority requires.
Note that object files are neither necessary nor sufficient for seeing an object: wemay see objects
without object files, as when they feature in the background of a scene but we fail to attend to
them, or when we see a larger number of objects than we could maintain separate object files
for,17 and there is some evidence that we can maintain an object file that fails to correspond to an
experiential object (Mitroff, Scholl, andWynn (2005)). Object files are significant for our purposes
because they reveal how the apparatus of conscious object perception is built around a temporally
extended mechanism that allows for at least the subpersonal maintenance of information specif-
ically about an object’s appearance even during brief periods of invisibility in a manner that also
seems to impact on a subject’s phenomenal experience.
2.3 What does the subject see?
What should we say about the subject’s visual experience at t3 in the occlusion case, the point at
which the object is behind the occluder? What can the subject be said to see at that moment in
time, if we treat the extended period of experience as the primary unit of visual perception?
The experimental evidence suggests that the subject is maintaining the relevant object file
throughout the period of time. But our criterion of seeing requires not just the presence of a sub-
personal representation of this kind, but a conscious visual representation of the object. The sub-
ject’s experience over the whole period of time is of the object passing behind the occluder and so
at t3 the subject’s experience is of the object behind the occluder that is, the content and character
of experience is not just sensitive to the occluder, but to the object behind it as well: that is what
gives rise to the tunnel effect. The object continues to play an active role in determining the sub-
ject’s phenomenology even whilst invisible. If we want to capture the difference in the conscious
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phenomenal experience of seeing an object pass behind the occluder and seeing it implode and
explode next to the occluder, we need to appeal to the fact that, for this brief period of time, the
subject represents the object as it passes behind the occluder, despite its temporary invisibility.
If that is right, thenwe sometimes see objects evenwhen they are not visible to us: at t3 a subject
Smay see an object O though at t3 O is not visible to S, in virtue of the fact that t3 is part of a longer
time period (t1-t5) throughout which S maintains a visual representation of O, which is causally
related to O in a straightforward way. In this way, accepting Dynamic Priority should lead us to
accept
Seeing the Invisible: a subject may see objects at time t which are not visible to her at t(*).
It is worth drawing out that Seeing the Invisible is inconsistent with
Occurrent Visibility: A subject S sees an object o at time t only if o is visible to S at t(*).
Taking seriously the dynamic nature of visual object perception requires us to relax our focus
onmomentary invisibility, and take a longer view, so to speak, of the relevant causal relationship
between the subject and their environment.
2.4 Tightening up
I have made a case that the subject’s relation to an occluded object can satisfy the first element
in the schematic criterion of seeing outlined above: they have a conscious visual experience of
the object. But what about the second and third – the requirement of reasonable sensitivity to the
object’s appearance, in virtue of an appropriate causal relationship to the object. I claim that this
case also satisfies a reasonable interpretation of each of these.
This claim faces some obvious problems in the case of an object that is invisible: how can a sub-
ject bear an appropriate causal relationship to an object when momentary invisibility interrupts
that causal relationship? And how can a causal chain that is interrupted in that way facilitate
a reasonable degree of sensitivity to the object’s appearance, given that the object is concealed
behind the occluder at that time?
Consider first of all whether the conscious experience bears an appropriate causal relation-
ship to the object. During occlusion, there are two causal relations in place. The presence of the
object before and, crucially, during the onset of occlusion causes the on-going representation of
it during occlusion. This causal relationship is temporally displaced to some degree: the causal
relationship between the object at t1*-t2* is responsible for the subject’s visual experience of the
object at t1-t2, but it plays a significant role in sustaining the experience during occlusion, that
is at t3 and beyond, until the object emerges from behind the occluder again. In particular, the
gradual way in which the object disappears behind the occluder allows the subject to continue
to maintain the relevant object file in a way that implosion does not. And so in addition, this
delayed causal relationship is coupled with an on-going causal relationship between the subject
and the occluder. That sustains the representation of the occluder, but also the representation
of the object as occluded. In section 3 we shall explore in more depth whether the temporal dis-
placement in the first of those causal relationships is consistent with visual perception. For the
moment, note that this is only a slight exaggeration of the displacement in the saccades case. Cases
of saccading and blinking, and the extension of object files themselves all suggest that the causal
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relationship between stimulus and conscious experience allows for some degree of temporal
flexibility.
Secondly, we need to consider whether such a displaced temporal relationship can support a
reasonable level of sensitivity to the object’s appearance during the moment of occlusion. Even
granting that the subject has a phenomenal awareness of the object, is that awareness reasonably
sensitive to the object’s appearance? How can a causal relationship support sensitivity to appear-
ance at a latermoment, particularly when it has already sustained a visual experience that is more
temporally proximate to the cause? This difficultymanifests in the way in which the experience of
the object during occlusion lacks the vivid phenomenology and the featural detail characteristic of
visual representation of a visible object: if the object changes shape or color during its occlusion,
our visual representation of it at that time will not be sensitive to that.
The subject is sensitive to the appearance of the object in two respects. Firstly, the subject rep-
resents the object as occluded and that is reflected in the visual appearance of the object which is
obstructed by the presence of the occluder. It might be objected that this demonstrates that we are
sensitive to the appearance of the occluder, not the object itself, and so it is worth noticing that
in addition to this, the subject does retain information about the appearance of the object itself.
Object files allow for residual sensitivity to phenomenal features despite the object’s temporary
invisibility. Consider the finding that feature change was more readily detected in cases of occlu-
sion than implosion (Flombaum & Scholl, 2006). That suggests that the subject does continue to
represent the object’s features during occlusion at least subpersonally, not just whether or not the
object continues to exist.
The conscious detail or vividness of the presentation of those features ismuted, of course. There
is in this respect a significant phenomenological difference between seeing occluded and non-
occluded objects. However, there are other cases too in which our perception of an object may
occur at so low a grade of resolution that we are incapable of perceiving its features in detail, for
instance when we see things at a distance or at the periphery of our visual field. An object at a
distance may present with sufficient ambiguity that we refrain from ascribing a color or size to it.
Nonetheless, it remains the case that we see the object, despite the absence of accurate featural
perception. We should not set the standard for reasonable sensitivity to the object’s appearance so
high that we exclude the possibility of seeing objects at a distance.18 The case of object perception
during occlusion is an extreme case of this: the lack of featural detail during the period of occlusion
is consistent with the visual representation of the object in question, particularly coupled with the
way in which the subject veridically represents the object as occluded.
It is important to remember that we are presupposing Dynamic Priority (objects). This is sig-
nificant because it shifts our frame: the moment is secondary to the longer period of experience.
Consider one straightforward ‘fix’ that would disqualify us from being said to see invisible objects:
simply building into the definition of what it is to see something that the object in question must
be visible to the subject at the moment when sight of it is ascribed to them. That is, we exclude in
principle possible vision of invisible objects.19
Butwhatmotivation dowehave to adopt such an exclusion? The insistence that the subject can-
not see the object in virtue of its invisibility depends on denying that priority of the extended visual
experience. It assumes the priority of the snapshot, and allows that visibility during that moment
is a criterion onwhat the subject can be said to see. Butwhy shouldmomentary (in)visibility be the
benchmark for whether a subject sees an object, oncewe recognize that themoment ismetaphysi-
cally subordinate to the extended experience? IfDynamic Priority is right, the subject never sees an
object at a single moment in time: the nature and function of object perception points us towards
understanding such representations as inherently temporally extended. Our understanding
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of what a subject sees at a given time should then be similarly sensitive to the priority of the
extended experience. The subject sees the object in virtue of its visibility during the majority of
the experience, and the on-going visual representation of it during the period of invisibility.
Let’s compare this case of momentary total occlusion with a case of partial occlusion across
a longer period of time. Suppose that I see my bicycle standing on the other side of a fence. If
you ask me if I can see my bicycle, it is clearly appropriate for me to answer yes, and not, for
instance, to say “well I can seemost of the front wheel and all of the back, and a few chunks of the
frame itself” even though the parts of the bicycle that are occluded are not themselves causing my
representation of the bicycle, and though the visual experience’s sensitivity to their appearance
is somewhat reduced (they could, for instance, change colour without my detecting it.) We reach
this verdict because we tend to treat entire objects as the primary spatial unit of perception.20
Similarly, it naturally follows from Dynamic Priority that we can see an object despite its total
occlusion at a moment in time, since the primary unit of experience is not thin temporal slices,
but a longer period of experience which is capable of supporting a conscious representation of
the object behind the occluder which is reasonably sensitive to the object’s appearance, despite
its momentary invisibility.
There is a risk that this argument gets lost in the semantics of what it takes to see something,
when the real import is for how we think of visual perception and what its fundamental task is.
We allow that you see your bicycle though the fence covers some portion of it, because we think
of visual perception as a relation to an object that can survive these partial elements of occlu-
sion. Appreciating the dynamic nature of object perception should push us towards a temporally
extendedunderstanding of object perceptionwhich can include temporal aswell as spatial pockets
of invisibility. In the next section I turn to considering the ramifications of this for our understand-
ing of the boundary between perception and memory.
3 PERCEPTION ORMEMORY?
The argument above relies on the claim that the visual experience the subject has during occlu-
sion is caused by the occluded object. This requires the causal relationship between object and
experience to accommodate a short time lag, in addition to that introduced by regular perceptual
processing: the subject’s experience of the object at t3, when it is behind the occluder, is caused by
the object at t1*-t2*,. Could this ground an objection to the claim we see invisible objects? Causes
always (perhaps necessarily) precede their effects, frequently by a prolonged period of time. But, it
might be claimed, the close temporal proximity of cause and experience is what distinguishes gen-
uine perception frommemory. By restricting the relevant causal relation between object and expe-
rience to one that is as temporally proximate as visual processing allows, we can categorize experi-
ence of momentarily occluded objects not as a genuinely visual or even perceptual phenomenon,
but rather as a process of cognitive representation, grounded heavily in memory. We cannot see
invisible objects but we can remember them. Perception is in part distinguished from memory
by its function of accurately reflecting the world currently before us, that is, the visible world in
particular.21
When discussing perception of motion, Reid advances something like this position:
[T]hough in common language we speak with perfect propriety and truth when we
say that we see a body move, and that motion is an object of sense, yet when as
Philosophers we distinguish accurately the province of sense from that of memory,
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we can no more see what is past, though but a moment ago, than we can remember
what is present; so that philosophically speaking, it is only by the aid of memory that
we discern motion, or any succession whatsoever. (1785/2015, -271)
Reid’s position can be readily extended to object perception during occlusion: accurately distin-
guishing the provinces of sense from memory will reveal to us that we cannot see objects during
occlusion. Whatever representations we maintain of them are in memory, not perception.
More recently, Elizabeth Spelke has advanced a similar line of argument, that object perception
per se is not genuinely visual. One strand of Spelke’s argument is particularly relevant here: her
appeal to the fact that objects continue to be represented at times when they are not visible, for
instance when they are fully occluded. In light of this representation during periods of invisibility,
Spelke argues that object representation is not a genuinely visual phenomenon. Rather, “[t]he
apprehension of objects is a cognitive act, brought about by a mechanism that begins to operate
at the point where perception ends” (Spelke, 1988, 199).
Applying this approach to the case of occlusion, we could allow that you represent or visually
refer to the object even when it is occluded, but insist that what you see exclude representations
whose cause is in the past to some significant degree (more than the brief delay mandated by the
need for perceptual processing).22
3.1 Conveyor belts and luggage carousels
This challenge assumes a clear-cut distinction between memory and perception, with perception
exclusively anchored in the fleeting present, and anything else confined to memory. The com-
plaint is that the argument above assigns perception of objects through occlusion to thewrong side
of that divide, because of too loose a temporal restriction on the causal relation in question. But is
so strict a demarcation sustainable? Memory clearly supports perceptual representation, and per-
ceptual representations are encoded in andmay rely onmemory. But how are we, more generally,
to conceive of the relationship between them? To what extent are these categories opposed to one
another, and to what extent are they overlapping or mutually constitutive?
On a flat-footed picture of the relationship between perception and memory there is a con-
veyer belt from one to the other. Perception involves the representation of a stimulus that is occur-
rently reflecting light into the eye. On this model, those representations are “briefly maintained
in a sensory register. . . ., processed in short-lived memory stores” (including transsaccadic mem-
ory, conceptual short-term memory and visual short-term memory), and then “[i]f attention is
maintained. . . consolidated in long-term memory” (Intraub & Dickinson, 2008, 1012).23 On this
approach, what you can be said to see at any given moment is what is currently reflecting light
into the eye at that moment, or at least within the few hundred milliseconds that it takes you to
perform the neural processing required to generate a visual representation on the basis of those
signals. Everything else is a form of memory.
The conveyor belt model has epistemic implications: as representations are shunted out of the
sensory workspace into increasingly stable forms of memory storage, they become vulnerable to
increasing levels of corruption, extra-sensory influences which impair the accuracy of the result-
ing representation. Its more intimate connection to the stimulus is what gives epistemic privilege
to the perceptual representation, because you can’t have perception without the stimulus, whereas
you can have memories in the absence of the stimulus itself.
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The conveyor belt picture, and the objection it supports, implies a simple contrast between
memory and perception: a representation is either perceptual, or stored in memory. Represen-
tations move from one to another. But our growing knowledge of the processes that underlie
visual perception puts pressure on that simple distinction: many visual experiences rely on con-
tents stored in memory, and at small temporal scales there is often no easy way of demarcating
working memory from perception.
It is well-established, for instance, that the visual system draws on stored information in
the form of priors, to resolve ambiguity in incoming retinal information. Those expectations
about the environment can be modified on the basis of previously encountered information.
For instance, the ambiguity between distance and size is resolved in part on the basis of stored
information about the kinds of objects we expect to encounter in a given environment, and
our familiarity with their standard size (Davenport & Potter, 2004; Palmer, 1975). These pri-
ors encode those previously encountered regularities. In this way, they are a form of long-term
memory.24
Relatedly, there is extensive evidence that information stored in both working and longer-
term memory influences the content of conscious perceptual experience. This is most eas-
ily detected when it gives rise to perceptual illusion: in color-memory effects, for instance,
stored information about the normal color of bananas and other objects influences sub-
jects’ perception of the color of images of them (Hansen, Olkkonen, Walter, & Gegenfurtner,
2006).25
This kind of to-and-fro of information between memory and perception has led to ambigu-
ity over whether certain illusions are properly seen as features of memory or of perception itself.
‘Boundary extension’ refers to the way in which subjects falsely report having seen beyond the
edges of an image in a picture, or the limits of their own visual field. If an image includes the
middle portion of a chair and table, say, viewers typically report having also seen the extremi-
ties of those objects. Intraub and Dickinson (2008) found that this effect arises extremely rapidly
– as soon as 1/20th of a second after exposure to an image. So fast is the construction of the
illusory content that they propose that it may instead be part of the initial perceptual rep-
resentation of the scene, and that that perceptual representation is not derived from a sin-
gle source of sensory input, but that it simultaneously draws on internally generated stores of
information.
Boundary extension also helps us understand the ecological role of that blending between
memory and perception: you can only look at a very small part of your environment at a time.
Constructing a representation of the periphery of your view, in a manner that integrates sen-
sory signal with information stored from moments before about how those now-invisible parts
of the scene look, helps you to act successfully in a 360o world. For our purposes, the final des-
ignation of the phenomenon is not as important as the possibility of dispute, and the support it
gives the claim that working memory plays an important and routine role in determining what
you see.
In light of these sorts of effects, rather than a conveyor belt, the relationship between percep-
tion and memory looks more like a luggage carousel: instead of a linear progression of informa-
tion from sensory registration through increasingly stable forms of memory storage, what we see
in perception is the repeated circling of some pieces of information whilst others come and go.
Items are added to the carousel as new sensory information is registered, and representations
leave the carousel as they cease to be maintained in a sensory register. But within the category
we intuitively recognize as perceptual, experience relies in a wide range of ways on information
stored in memory.
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3.2 Occurrent retinal stimulation as a criterion of seeing
These effects show that working memory can blend with sensory information to produce a con-
scious experience. But in the case of invisibility, the subject’s experience of the relevant object
would need to be entirely supported by memory at a moment in time. And that seems to flout
an obvious way of distinguishing visual perception and memory: the former cannot arise in
the absence of retinal stimulation by light reflected from the object, whereas memory can.
Hence, whatever object representations can be maintained in the absence of such stimulation
are mnemonic rather than visual.
Unfortunately, the case of saccades undermines the viability of occurrent dependence on reti-
nal stimulation as a criterion of seeing. When saccading you rely on memory to integrate dis-
tinct frames of fixation: memory of what you saw in the moments immediately before lets you
pick up where you left of, making sense of the new information by integrating it with the
old into a coherent, detailed model of your surroundings (Hollingworth et al., 2008). More-
over, during the brief period of saccadic suppression, visual persistence (the maintenance of a
visual image that persists after the cessation of light signals on the retina), is achieved by “fill-
ing in” the experience with information gathered a moment before, allowing us not to notice
the continual interruption of our experience by these events in which the sensory signal is
interrupted.
During a saccade, your experience is briefly independent of occurrent sensory stimulation: it
relies on information from a moment before. A view that claims such stimulation is essential for
perception is forced to say that our conscious experience flips constantly between moments of
seeing and moments of remembering. And yet to the subject these states are functionally and
phenomenally indistinguishable. The occurrent stimulus criterion leaves us then with a bound-
ary between perception and memory that fails to track a distinction of theoretical or functional
significance. It would be highly artificial to insist on segmenting our ordinary experience into
milliseconds of seeing and milliseconds of remembering. Rather than insisting that you stop see-
ing whilst you are remembering, we should allow that memory supports a temporally extended
visual experience that continually blends moments of occurrent sensory stimulation with stored
information from moments before.
Canwe scale this claim up to the case of occlusion, where the subject is consciously aware of the
momentary invisibility of the object? In one sense, the subject’s representation is clearly visual,
since they represent the object as occluded and the relationship between subject and occluder
is not subject to any temporal delay. But this might be taken to support merely a visual repre-
sentation of the occluder, not of the object itself, on the grounds that that the period of inde-
pendence of the object representation from retinal stimulation is too long. In response to this,
the case of saccades suggests that temporal dislocation per se does not provide a criterion that
can successfully distinguish memory and perception. The question then is what degree of tem-
poral dislocation is tolerable. There is unlikely to be a clear cut off. But a dynamic priority
claim licenses a greater degree of flexibility in the causal relation between object and experi-
ence: we plausibly need causal contact at some point during the extended period of time that
has priority in determining the content and character of the moment in question. That is satis-
fied in the case of the tunnel effect: the object provides proximate retinal stimulation prior to its
momentary occlusion, which continues to influence the content and character of the experience
during its brief period of invisibility, as reflected in the experience of it as passing behind the
occluder.
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3.3 A neural criterion?
Could facts about neural activity provide a simple way of teasing apart visual experiences from
memories? It is natural to hope that mapping which areas of the brain are particularly active
whilst the subject sustains a given representation could provide a clearer criterion, and one that
might give grounds to dismiss the representation of occluded objects as an instance of memory
rather than perception.
Appealing to a neural criterion relies on a prior theoretical commitment, to allowing facts about
brain activity to guide our psychological distinctions, but that is a commonplace enough assump-
tion.We know, for instance, that activity in the visual cortex, areas V1 through V4, supports visual
perception. The hippocampus plays a particular role in serving explicit episodic and semantic
memory, with implicit memory relying on the amygdala, and the prefrontal cortex subserving
working memory specifically. If the maintenance of representations during occlusion relied not
on the visual cortex but on areas more commonly associated with memory, that might give us
some reason to regard extended object representations during occlusion as a form of memory
rather than perception.
The first difficulty with this approach is that the crucial underlying assumption on which it
rests, namely that there is a clear or consistent distinction between the areas of the brain respon-
sible for visual representation and representation in memory, is false. There is good evidence that
neural activity in the visual cortex is, on occasion, common to the maintenance of representa-
tions held in working memory over periods of several seconds in the absence of a physical stim-
ulus, as well as to visual perception. Take, as an example of such work, a study by Harrison and
Tong (2009). Harrison and Tong showed participants two gratings that varied in their orienta-
tion, one after the other. They then provided them with a numerical cue, indicating that they
should remember either the first or the second of the gratings they had been showed. After an 11
second retention interval, a test grating was presented, and participants were tasked with indicat-
ing which way it was rotated, relative to the cued grating. They found that observers performed
equally well, regardless of which grating was cued, and that they were capable of discriminating
small differences in orientation between the cued grating and the test, indicating that they were
successfully remembering the stimuli. But most significantly, they found that “ensemble activ-
ity pooled from areas V1-V4, was highly predictive of the orientation held in working memory,
with prediction accuracy reaching 83%” (2009, 633). Activity in those areas is normally strongly
associated with visual perception. The fact that pooled information from those areas allowed the
experimenters to predict which orientation was held in workingmemory suggests that those neu-
ral populations taken to underwrite visual representations play an important role in supporting
representations in memory too. Their conclusion was that “retaining an orientation in working
memory recruits many of the same orientation-selective subpopulations as those that are acti-
vated under stimulus-drive conditions”(2009, 633). The authors take their results to show that
“early visual areas are not only important for processing information about the immediate sen-
sory environment, but can also maintain information in the absence of direct input to support
higher-order cognitive function” (2009, 634).26 If that is right, then there is no clear or abrupt
distinction even in the neuronal populations that support perception and memory.
But this first difficulty pales when placed beside a second: the interpretation of these kinds
of results itself relies on substantive theoretical commitments. Take work by Hulme and Zeki
(2007) looking at neural activity in areas of the brain associated with the perception of particular
objects during their occlusion. Perception of faces often correlates with activity in the fusiform
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face area, for instance, whilst the lateral occipital complex is known to play a particular role in
the visual perception and recognition of objects. Hulme and Zeki showed subjects displays in
which an image of a face or a house either remained visible whilst a screen rose behind it, or was
occluded to 98% by the screen rising in front of it. They then measured activity in brain regions
over the next 7.5 seconds whilst subjects continued to look at the occluded object. They found
that “activity within the FFA and LOC is invariant to whether objects are occluded or not. . . . The
surprise lies in the fact that the areaswere activatedwith the samemagnitude and had very similar
time courses, whether perceived or not” (2007, 1201).
On the basis of this, Hulme and Zeki conclude that activity in these regions indicates awareness
of presence rather than perception, as had previously been assumed. But an alternative interpreta-
tion is available: that activity in these areas does indeed indicate perception, and that the objects
in question continue to be perceived even as most of their surface is not currently visible. In these
cases, subjects had no occurrent stimulation. Whatever representations subjects maintained of
the objects in question relied on memory, but it was nonetheless reflected in activity in regions of
the brain traditionally associated with perception.
Might Hulme and Zeki’s argument implicitly appeal to the following more sophisticated form
of neural criterion: genuine perception requires not just activation of the visual cortex, but activa-
tion throughout the standard set of neural areas associate with perception, that is, the retina, the
optic nerve, the magno- and parvocellular pathways in addition to the visual cortex. What makes
representations of invisible objects instances of memory rather than perception, as during occlu-
sion or saccadic suppression, is that there is a lack of activity at some point in that chain, even if
certain parts of the visual cortex continues to be recruited in service of these representations.27
Setting aside the difficulty of arriving at a non-question begging description of those areas,
this proposal ultimately serves to highlight the limitations of the neural approach. In the first
place, experience of occluded objects is consistent with stimulation of the full range of neuronal
activity associate with perception, since the occluder continues to reflect light into the retina,
even if the object behind it does not. And in the other direction, there seem to be moments of
visual perception which fail to satisfy this criterion. Recall the case of visual experience during
saccades. At these moments there is reduced activity in the magnocellular pathway. But we saw
previously that it would be undesirable to classify the experience had during these moments as
failing to constitute a moment of seeing. But if we count visual experience at moments of saccadic
suppression as a form of seeing, then it looks like there is no clear paradigmatic case of perceptual
experience that satisfies this proposed criterion. Even thismore sophisticated neural criterion fails
to successfully demarcate remembering from seeing.
3.4 Taking stock
Wehave surveyed a range of ways in which one’s visual experience at amoment is not, and cannot
be, immediately derived from the stimulation of the retina at that moment. Long termmemory is
an essential ingredient, as priors resolve ambiguity in retinal input. Working memory routinely
blends with sensory information to inform the content of visual experience. Transsacadic mem-
ory joins up brief spells of sensory information into a coherent experience. There is considerable
overlap between the neural structures and activity associated with memory and perception. The
upshot of all this for our purposes is that reliance onmemory fails to provide a coherent reason for
disqualifying occluded object apprehension from visual perception. Extended object perception
relies on memory, but so do many other core aspects of perception.
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4 CONCLUSION
Conscious visual experience is a fusion of elements from short-term (working) memory, long-
term memory (priors), and occurrent sensory stimulation. This thorough-going infusion of
memory into perception makes it hard to draw a clean line between what you are currently
seeing, and what you are merely remembering. Far from living in the present, an entwinement
with the past is inherent in the most basic of perceptual capacities, our perception of objects in
the world around us.
The involvement of memory provides no barrier to recognising extended object perception as
a genuinely visual form of representation. Settling that clears the way for the claim that a subject
sees the object as it passes behind the occluder, despite its momentary invisibility.
In some ways this is a highly surprising upshot. But it seems less counterintuitive if we relax
a habitual insistence on the priority of the moment in visual perception. The object in question
is only properly deemed invisible when we use the moment as the criterion for invisibility. If we
instead prioritise a longer period of time, then the object is visible during that time frame. Read
another way, the argument here encourages us to be dynamists about visibility, as well as about
visual perception. When we do so, we treat visual perception as a modelling process that can at
points operate independently of occurrent retinal input.
However we accommodate the claim that we see the object as it passes behind the occluder -
whether we think of visibility as a dynamic property, or allow that we can see invisible objects -
goes to the core of what visual perception is: accommodating the dynamism of visual experience
forces us to think of it not just as a process of passive reflection such that any extended period of
experience supervenes on its component instants, but as an extended process of active modelling
of the environment on the basis of a particular set of light signals. That active modelling can
continue, to a limited extent at least, during periods of occlusion, or other moments when less
sensory information is available. Dynamic perception, properly understood, involves developing
andmaintainingmodels of the environment. Thosemodels are largely driven by occurrent retinal
stimulation, but that retinal stimulation is used to best purpose when it forms the basis of more
extensive representations capable of integrating information gathered at different moments in
time.
It is commonplace to emphasise the challenge of visually representing a 3Dworld on the basis of
2D light signals. That underdetermination is certainly part of what mandates a reliance on stored
information. Less emphasis has been given to another challenge the visual system faces: that of
representing a dynamic, changing environment that extends to 360 degrees whilst only being able
to direct its gaze towards one direction at a time. To solve that more comprehensive problem, the
visual systemmust be a skillful quilter, uniting spatially and temporally disparate pieces of retinal
information into a representation that is coherent and unified across both time and space.28
NOTES
1 Note that we are not (primarily) interested in the question of whether visual perceptual processing is temporally
extended. Visual processing in creatures like ourselves takes time. That does not decide the question of dynamic
priority. It is possible that the result of such a temporally extended process could be a snapshot with no duration
itself, just as a still life painting that captures the rotting fruit bowl at a single moment on a heavy summer
afternoon may have taken a much longer time to produce.
2 See Chuard (2011, 15) for an articulation of dynamic priority as the claim that the experience fails to supervene
on a succession of its parts.
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3 It is tempting to confuse the question of whether the most basic unit of visual experience is temporally extended
with the question of whether visual experience is discrete or continuous, but the two questions come apart.
Whilst it can seem natural to suppose that snapshots would be discrete, if continuity is understood merely the
absence of gaps, and if experience is potentially composed of an infinite sequence of snapshots, then visual experi-
ence could be a continuous sequence of snapshots. Equally, the dynamist can also allow that there are privileged
joints in the flow of visual experience that allow us to distinguish extended experiential atoms from one another.
See Lee (2014) whose retentionalism is by his own description a form of “extended atomism”.
4 See Dainton, 2000 for amuch fuller exposition. Some extensionalists, like Phillips, in addition endorse an inher-
itance principle: not only are temporal experiences themselves temporally extended, but “for any temporal prop-
erty apparently presented in perceptual experience, experience itself has that same temporal property” (Phillips,
2014, 131). An experience of one event succeeding another, for instance, entails that the experience of the second
event succeeds the experience of the first (though Phillips also denies that temporal content is explained by the
temporal properties of the experience).
5 I also take Dynamic Priority to be incompatible with a variant of the snapshot or cinematic model, the so-called
dynamic snapshot view endorsed by Prosser (2016) and Le Poidevin (2007) among others, according to which
snapshots can include dynamic content, without the resulting experience having any temporal breadth. See
Shardlow (2019) for an exposition and critique of these views.
6 Again, questions about the extension of the subject’s experience should be distinguished from the period of time
over which the perceptual system gathers the information which it integrates in order to arrive at a subjective
experience – the window of temporal integration (Forget, Buiatti, & Dehaene, 2009; van Wassenhove, Grant, &
Poeppel, 2007). The snapshot view of experience is quite compatible with a view on which those snapshots are
based on an extended window of temporal integration.
7 Whitney Houston and Beyonce’s renditions of the Stars and Stripes at the 1991 and 2016 Superbowls are good
examples of a perfect and an interrupted cadence respectively.
8 See Tyler Burge (2010, 450–65) for the claim that a capacity to perceive objects as temporally extended is a nec-
essary prerequisite for object perception.
9 We visually experience objects in the environment as having a constant shape and colour, though the proximal
retinal stimulation they give rise to changes moment by moment as we and they move, and light levels change.
The phenomenal primacy of perceptual constancy is at least suggestive of a dynamic priority claim, as it can
only emerge over a protracted period of time. See Hatfield and Allred (2012) for further empirical discussion of
perceptual constancy.
10 More controversially, objects may be invisible in this sense when they are transparent, or when it is dark. For an
argument that we see objects in the dark that provides an alternative route to Seeing the Invisible see Sorensen
(2004).
11 The extent of saccadic suppression depends on spatial frequency: high spatial frequencies may become invisible
whilst lower spatial frequencies becomemore conspicuous, suggesting that saccadic suppressionmay be specific
to the magnocellular pathway, and effect motion sensitivity in particular (Ross, Morrone, Goldberg, & Burr,
2001).
12 Is that diminution in sensitivity to location inconsistent with reasonable sensitivity to the object’s appearance?
There is good reason to think not. Attentional effects introduce widespread though minor distortions in spatial
perception in ways that have implications for the representation of object location (Gobell and Carasco 2005,
Liverence & Scholl, 2011). Imposing too high a standard of sensitivity to object location risks excluding many
plausible cases from satisfying the criterion of seeing. I say more about what the requirement of reasonable
sensitive entails below in section 2.4.
13 I am indebted to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting a similar case to this.
14 Interested readers can compare the relevant cases here: http://perception.yale.edu/Brian/demos/Tunnel-CD.
html
15 For how long do object files persist? Noles, Scholl, and Mitroff (2005) found evidence that they can persist for at
least 8 seconds. They write that “[o]bject files may be the “glue” that makes visual experience coherent not just
in onlinemoment-by-moment processing, but on the scale of seconds that characterizes our everyday perceptual
experiences” (2005, 324).
16 Does appealing to object files to support a claim about the nature of perceptual representation involve a
vehicle/content confusion? Dennett and Kinsbourne warn that "In general, we must distinguish features of
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representings from the features of representeds; someone can shout “softly, on tiptoe” at the top of his lungs,
there are gigantic pictures of microscopic objects, and oil paintings of artists making charcoal sketches. The top
sentence of a written description of a standing man need not describe his head, nor the bottom sentence his
feet. To suppose otherwise is to confusedly superimpose two different spaces: the representing space and the
represented space"(1992, 188). Though their point is well taken, it’s equally noticeable that the vehicle of repre-
sentation does constrain the content in various ways. The content of an oil painting may be limited by its size
and shape. A collection of several oil paintings make different kinds of representation possible than just a single
painting can on its own. And there are certain forms of content which are entirely precluded by the medium of
an oil painting. For this reason, it can be legitimate to look to features of the vehicle to tell us something about the
parameters within which visual representation operates. The temporal persistence of object files, our best psy-
chological model of the underlying mechanism of object representation, is an important mechanism by which
information gathered over an extended period of time can be integrated to inform the contents of a temporally
extended conscious experience. The presence of that mechanism at least allows for greater flexibility between
the time at which retinal information is registered and its manifestation in a conscious visual experience.
17 There is evidence of a capacity limit of roughly 4 on the number of objects that we can successfully track at
a time, possibly reflecting the fact that maintaining these files taxes limited attentive resources (Scholl and
Pylyshyn 1999, though see Alvarez & Franconeri, 2007 for evidence of greater flexibility in these limits). We
frequently attend to some objects whilst continuing to see others in the background. In such a case we are
unlikely to maintain object files for those unattended objects given the limit on how many such files we are
capable of simultaneously maintaining. This is evidenced by our difficulties detecting featural changes in cases
of inattentive change blindness (Simons and Levin 1997).
18 This invites the question: where shouldwe set the relevant bar? Howmuch sensitivity to the object’s appearance
does the criterion of seeing require? It is unlikely that there will be any clear cut off here, particularly since the
appropriate vividness of the representation of the objectwill depend on contextual factors including distance and
climate, for instance. The relevant standard may in part be a negative one: reasonable sensitivity is inconsistent
with gross misrepresentation of an object’s features though compatible with agnosticism about them, as when
the subject is seen at a distance, or with errors about several individual properties.
19 Lande (ms.) quotes Child (1992, 311) voicing the claim that this is in fact a condition on conceptual possession:
“If one has the concept of vision, one knows that S will stop seeing something if he shuts his eyes, or if we
interpose something opaque between him and the object.”
20 See Lande (ms.) for interesting discussion of relevant empirical work by Gold, Murray, Bennett, and Sekuler
(2000), that suggests subjects viusally interpolate occluded countours of an object, in away that can be disrupted
by visual noise, despite the invisibility of the relevant parts of the objects.
21 Note, though, that the subject who sees the object behind the occluder is accurately representing theworld before
them: they represent the fact the object is still there but that it is temporarily occluded by another object.
22 See Lande (ms.) for an argument that visual reference extends beyond seeing to include cases where (parts of)
the target objects are not visible.
23 Intraub and Dickinson offer this articulate description of a traditional picture which they themselves challenge.
24 Even the prior that light comes from above has been shown to be modifiable by interactive experience within
an environment (Adams, Graf, & Ernst, 2004)
25 See alsoMendoza, Schneiderman, Kaul, andMartinez-Trujillo (2011) andKang,Hong, Blake, &Woodman, 2011)
for work that purports to show the influence of contents stored in short-term working memory on conscious
visual experience.
26 Could we test the claim that visual perception is thoroughgoingly reliant on memory, by looking to see if amne-
sia is associated with deficits in visual perception? Unfortunately, the answer to this is complex: amnesia is often
associated with deficits in perception, but it is unclear whether that is because memory subserves perception,
or because the kinds of neural deficits responsible for the amnesia are also responsible for independent impair-
ments to perception. For instance, Lee et al. (2005) found that damage to the hippocampus, an area of the brain
known to underwrite various forms of memory, was accompanied by poorer skills at visually discriminating
spatial scenes. That finding could be interpreted either as evidence for the role of memory in perceiving spatial
scenes, or as evidence of the role of the hippocampus in supporting spatial perception independently of the role
it plays in memory.
27 I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for directing my attention to this possible criterion.
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28 For discussion of earlier drafts of this paper I am grateful to audiences at CUNY, the 2018 meeting of the Society
for Philosophy and Psychology, Oxford’s Jowett society, a workshop on perception at the University of Glasgow,
and theUniversity of Texas at AustinMindWork seminar. Thanks toGreysonAbid, RichardHolton, Ian Phillips,
Jake Quilty-Dunn, Jack Shardlow, Susanna Siegel, and Kate Vredenburgh for comments on or discussion of
various parts of this material. I am particularly indebted to an anonymous reviewer at this journal for their
extensive comments which greatly improved the paper.
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